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Recognizing that even though states have the
primary responsibility to promote, secure the
fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of, and
protect human rights, transnational corpora-
tions and other business enterprises, as organs
of society, are also responsible for promoting
and securing the human rights set forth in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
(United Nations Social and Economic Council, 2003, p. 1)
Corporations . . . are increasingly being asked to step into roles that were
once the domain of governments or interna-
tional bodies such as the United Nations.
Defining what is properly expected of a
company needs to be more clearly articu-
lated and rigorously debated.’’
(Jim Buckee, CEO Talisman Energy. Corporate Social
Responsibility Group, 2001, p. 5)
InNovember 2001 a $1billion class-action lawsuit was brought against
Talisman Energy, a large Canadian independent oil and gas producer,
on behalf of the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and a number of
individual plaintiffs. The plaintiffs allege that Talisman violated the
human rights of Christian and other non-Muslim minorities in Sudan
as part of its oil exploration, development, and production operations
in that country. Specifically, the suit accuses Talisman of conducting a
campaign of ethnic cleansing to clear the land for oil operations
(Wichita Global Coalition, 2001; D’Avino, 2002).1
1 The suit was later amended to include the Government of Sudan as a
defendant; a motion to dismiss on the part of Talisman was rejected by a
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Talisman is a Canadian company is charged with violating the
human rights of Sudanese in Sudan; the alleged actions did not involve
American nationals nor did they take place on American territory. The
case was brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) which
permits aliens to sue in a US court for torts committed abroad in
violation of the ‘‘law of nations’’ or a treaty of the United States. The
ATCA dates from 1789, and while it may have been enacted to combat
piracy, Congress’ original intentions have been lost in the mists of time
(Amon, 2000; Bridgeford, 2003).
The Act lay dormant for almost 200 years until 1980 when a Circuit
Court allowed two Paraguayans to sue a Paraguayan police inspector
for the torture and death of a family member under the ACTA
(Developments in the Law, 2001). In the last decade there has been
‘‘a growing tide of litigation’’ under the Act attempting to hold multi-
national corporations responsible for human rights violations occurring
in the course of their subsidiaries’ operations. Suits have been brought
against Texaco in Ecuador, Chevron in Nigeria, Exxon-Mobil in
Indonesia, and perhaps most notably, UNOCAL in Burma. American
courts have held that gross violations of human rights such as summary
execution, torture, slavery or forced labor, genocide and cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment violate the ‘‘law of nations’’ and are thus
actionable under ACTA (Developments in the Law, 2001; Blumberg,
2002; Olsen, 2002; Perlez, 2002).
The Alien Torts Claims Act cases raise a number of interesting
questions, two of which are directly relevant here. First, what does it
mean to say that a multinational corporation (MNC) is ‘‘complicit’’ in
human rights violations? Is actual participation in recruiting or using
forced labor, for example, necessary or is the fact that the company
knew, or should have known, that abuses were taking place sufficient?
(I will deal with this issue in much more detail below.) Second, why are
these cases, some of which neither involve American nationals nor acts
committed on US territory, being brought in the US, why do American
courts claim ‘‘universal jurisdiction’’ (Developments in the Law,
2001)?
There are practical and conceptual answers to this second question,
both of which involve a ‘‘governance gap’’ resulting from incomplete
District Court Judge inMarch 2003 when the judge ruled that the case was
properly brought in a Manhattan court (Neumeister, 2003).
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globalization: an integrated world economy governed by political
authorities which are still primarily local and national. The nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) concernedwith the impact of Talisman’s
operations in Sudan on human rights had a limited range of options.2
The host country (Sudan) was obviously unwilling to pursue the matter
and the home country (Canada) either unwilling or unable to deal with
what amounted to extraterritorial activities on the part of one of its
companies. Furthermore, as a private firm, Talisman’s activities in
Sudan were beyond the reach of international organizations such as
the United Nations. Thus, a case brought under the ACTA in a US court
provided one of the few venues available to NGOs to pursue aMNC for
alleged human rights violations in an international system characterized
by fragmented, geographically based political and regulatory authority.
The modern international political system reflects its Westphalian
origins: it is defined by mutually exclusive territorial jurisdiction, geo-
graphic sovereignty, and state-centrism – states as the only political
actors and the only subjects of international law. Given these para-
meters, private actors such as business firms are objects rather than
subjects, their role, authority, and responsibilities in international politics
(and international law) are strictly limited.
The process of globalization brings significant changes to the organi-
zation of international politics and economics. The once clear line
between domestic and international affairs has blurred and morphed
into what Rosenau calls the ‘‘domestic-foreign frontier’’ (1997), in
many respects borders are no longer either discrete or meaningful.
Furthermore, states are no longer the only significant international
political actors; while they may still occupy a ‘‘seat at the head of the
table,’’ advocacy groups and other NGOs, international institutions,
and multinational firms have considerable power in the international
politics. As Cutler observes ‘‘Westphalian-inspired notions of state-
centricity, positivist international law, and ‘public’ definitions of
authority are incapable of capturing the significance of non-state
actors, like transnational corporations and individuals . . . and private
economic power in the global economy’’ (2001, p. 133).
2 As will be discussed below, the advocacy groups concerned with
Talisman’s operations in Sudan mounted a very successful campaign
aimed at institutional investors and shareholders which, in large part,
was responsible for Talisman withdrawing from Sudan in 2003.
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If multinational firms have become significant actors in international
politics, they definitionally command some degree of ‘‘authority.’’ It is
a short step from acknowledging multinationals as commanding some
degree of ‘‘public authority’’ to holding them responsible for public
functions such as the protection of human rights. The ACTA cases in
American courts can be seen as a tentative, if very controversial, step in
that direction.
I next turn to a more complete discussion of the question of public
authority and responsibility in the international system, both in general
and as regards MNCs. I will then review the experience of Talisman
Energy in Sudan, especially in regards to the charges brought against it
by a variety of groups that it was complicit in the very severe violations
of human rights that have occurred in that country during its brutal
civil war. I will then attempt to use the Talisman case to try to generalize
about multinational firms’ responsibilities for human rights. I conclude
by exploring questions of the limits of public responsibilities of multi-
national firms.
Private actors in international politics
While the international business literature deals with questions of
fragmentation of strategy and the limits of headquarters’ control over
subsidiaries, the multinational enterprise is typically seen as a single
transnational enterprise operating in a relatively large number of coun-
tries. We talk about Shell, Oil, Sony, and Lever as coherent global
entities.
The legal reality is quite different, the multinational – as such – does
not exist. It is not possible to incorporate under international law: the
global firm is an apparition (Cutler, 2001), a coalition of companies
incorporated under the laws of many different states. Thus, under
accepted principles of international law, ‘‘each of the constituent cor-
porations of a corporate group is a national of the nation-state in which
it has been incorporated and subject to the laws of that state’’
(Blumberg, 2002, p. 494).
For private firms operating transnationally, ‘‘legal personality is
conferred under national and municipal laws, and corporate rights,
duties, and remedies remain a function of national law.’’ As a result, the
legal (and political) rights and obligations of multinational firms are
derivative, they flow from their status as national firms responsive to
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national governments (Cutler, 2001, p. 141). Thus, the fact that private
multinational firms lack ‘‘legal personality’’ renders them unaccount-
able under international law. ‘‘TNCs benefit from their international
nonstatus. Nonstatus immunizes them from direct accountability to
international legal norms and permits them to use sympathetic national
governments to parry outside efforts to mold their behavior’’ (Charney,
1983, cited in Cutler 2001, p. 143).
States are the only ‘‘subjects’’ of traditional international law, the
only entities with legal rights and duties. International law does not
either articulate the obligations of corporations with regards to human
rights or provide a mechanism for regulating, or even monitoring,
corporate behavior in that area (Developments in the Law, 2001).
Multinational firms are private actors who owe an obligation to their
shareholders to produce profits and whose obligation to the state is
defined by law and regulation. ‘‘(P)rivate non-state actors, such as
MNEs, do not have any positive duty to observe human rights. Their
only duty is to obey the law. Thus it is for the state to regulate on
matters of social importance and for MNEs to observe the law’’
(Muchlinski, 2001, p. 35).
This sharp distinction between the public and private spheres is not
inherent in the human experience, but rather a property of the
Westphalian international system and the development of the sovereign
territorial state. During the feudal period, political authoritywas diffuse,
ambiguous, interwoven, and non-territorial (Kobrin, 1998; Cutler,
1999). There was no clear line between the public and private spheres,
between political and economic authority. The public/private distinc-
tion developed with the rise of the territorially sovereign state and the
development of private property and property rights (Cutler, 1999).
Modern ideas about the distinction between public political authority
and private economic markets and actors developed in the nineteenth
century with the rise of the self-regulating market. As Cutler notes, the
market ‘‘perfected the association of ‘political’ and legal authority with
the public sphere of governments and the association of ‘apolitical’
economic relations with the private sphere of individuals and markets’’
(Cutler, 2001, p. 138).
In the traditional liberal view only ‘‘public’’ entities – states and other
governmental units – have political authority. Markets and firms are
private, commanding economic but not political authority or respon-
sibilities. During the twentieth century, what Muchlinski (2001, p. 36)
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has called ‘‘a remarkably resilient model of a liberal market society’’
developed, characterized by a clear distinction between the public and
private spheres. Liberalism ‘‘renders private authority an impossibility
by creating the distinction between public and private activities and
locating the ‘right to rule’ or authority squarely in the public sphere’’
(Cutler, 1999, p. 73, emphasis in the original).
That once clear distinction has blurred considerably with the political
and economic changes that have accompanied globalization. In a
rapidly evolving post-Westphalian world it has become reasonable to
talk about private political authority and private political obligations.
The standardWestphalian assumptions about power and authority are
no longer capable of explaining contemporary reality (Cutler, 2001).
Globalization – defined in terms of deep, networked integration of
economies, societies, and polities – involves significant systemic changes
in the structure or organization of international economics and politics
(Kobrin, 1997). Political authority has become fragmented and inter-
woven once again with the emergence of non-state entities such as civil
society groups (NGOs) and multinational corporations as significant
actors in international politics, the increased salience of international
institutions such as the World Trade Organization, and the rise of
supra-national powers such as the European Union. While states may
still be the dominant players in the system, the state-centric model has
broken down and states have lost power to other actors and tomarkets
(Strange, 1996). States function, at least in part, as economic actors and
multinational firms influence political outcomes (Cutler, 2001).
The result is a complex evolving international political system in
which sovereign states are still dominant, but non-state entities are
significant, authoritative actors (Burke, 1999). Much of the literature
on private authority argues that the international integration of mar-
kets has affected the ability and willingness of states to intervene in
economic affairs and is concerned with the role of multinational firms
and other private actors in standard setting, the impact of privately
arbitrated dispute resolution and, more generally, the role of firms in
the governance of international economic affairs (Cutler, Haufler,
and Porter, 1999; Haufler, 2001, p. 5). In addition, as Muchlinski
(2001, p. 40) observes, the fact that MNCs participate directly in the
activities of international institutions such as the WTO and EU
creates ‘‘the clear perception of MNEs as entities capable of exerting
power over public policy.’’
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My concern here is not the exercise of public authority by multi-
nationals but rather the corresponding public responsibilities ofMNCs
in a number of important issue areas. One example is the global battle
against AIDS where private multinational firms are being pressured to
take on increasingly important public roles (Beattie, 2003). Another is
human rights where responsibility, and perhaps liability, follows from
MNCs role in the ‘‘global order’’ (Bridgeford, 2003). ‘‘The traditional
notion that only states and state agents can be held accountable for
violations of human rights is being challenged as the economic and
social power of MNEs appears to rise in the wake of the increasing
integration of the global economy that they have helped to bring
about’’ (Muchlinski, 2001, p. 31).
Human rights has become a significant international issue and,
notions of sovereignty aside, human rights violations within countries
are nowdeemed to be the responsibility of the ‘‘international community.’’
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Anan argues that traditional
notions of sovereignty can no longer do justice to people’s aspirations
for human freedom; that nothing in the U.N. charter ‘‘precludes a
recognition that there are rights beyond borders’’ (Littlejohns and
Buchan, 1999, p. 5).
The problem at this point is that the ‘‘international community’’ is
still an ambiguous construct.While less so than in the past, in all but the
most egregious circumstances states are reluctant to cross borders to
intervene to protect human rights. International organizations have
neither the resources nor the capabilities to enforce human rights or
even to monitor violations. As a result, the primary responsibility for
monitoring human rights violations, publicizing problem areas, and
advocating remedial action often falls on private civil society groups or
NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,
among many others.
As Haufler (2001, p. 29) observes, ‘‘When governments do not govern,
the private sector does – often in response to the demands of public
interest groups who find themselves unable to move national govern-
ments.’’ As noted above,MNCs are increasingly perceived as significant,
authoritative actors in international politics, actors with meaningful
political power. However, political authority is a two-sided coin. On
the one hand, MNCs are perceived as having the political power to
positively affect human rights regimes in host countries. On the other
hand, they are increasingly being held responsible – as quasi-public
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actors – for human rights violations occurring in conjunction with their
subsidiaries’ operations.
Advocacy groups increasingly target MNCs directly (Broad and
Cavanagh, 1998). NGOs monitor human rights violations occurring
in conjunction with corporate activity, publicize themwidely and often
very effectively, and bring pressure to bear on home-country govern-
ments, but more importantly, managers, shareholders, and investors to
effect change. MNCs are being held ‘‘liable’’ – at least in the forum of
public opinion and perhaps in the courts – for ‘‘complicity’’ in human
rights violations. More interestingly, as the quote at the start of this
paper illustrates, MNCs are increasingly seen as having a positive
responsibility or duty for promoting and securing human rights, for
using their power and influence to change a given regime’s human
rights policies and practices.
That raises some critical questions. First, if MNCs are to be held
responsible for complicity in human rights violations, what does com-
plicity entail? Is simply entering a countrywhere human rights violations
are the norm complicity or, at the other end of the scale, does a firm have
to actually participate in activities that violate the rights of individuals?
Second, who is to establish the parameters of corporate responsibilities
for human rights, and how are violations to be monitored and judged
and penalties for transgressions enforced? The experience of Talisman
Energy in Sudan is directly relevant and provides a rich case study in
which to ground further discussion of these issues.
War in Sudan3
Sudan has been engaged in civil war for thirty-six of the forty-seven
years since its independence from Great Britain in 1956. The ‘‘second
civil war,’’ which began in 1983, has been characterized by a vicious
brutality that has resulted in twomillion deaths – themajority of whom
are civilians – and over four million displaced persons (International
Crisis Group, 2002; Martin, 2002). Sudan sits squarely on the divide
between primarily Arab and Moslem North Africa and the primarily
Black, Christian and ‘‘Animist’’ area south of the Sahara; the southern
provinces are ethnically diverse containing a large number of tribes and
3 See (Kobrin, 2003) for a more complete discussion of the origins of the civil
war in Sudan.
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linguistic groups (Idahosa, 2002). A focal point of the war has been the
Upper West Nile region in which Talisman’s operations were located.
The rebellion in the southern provinces at independence intensified
in 1958 when a campaign by the government in the North to forcibly
extend Islam to the south resulted in a full-fledged civil war
(International Crisis Group, 2002). The ‘‘end’’ of the first civil war
came in 1972with the Addis Ababa agreement which provided security
guarantees and some degree of political and economic autonomy to
the south. However, by the end of that decade, the government in
Khartoum came under pressure from hardliners to re-exert control
over the south and the regime embraced strict Islamism (Sudan
Update, 1999; Gagnon and Ryle, 2001; Idahosa, 2002).
The situation in Sudanwas complicated by the discovery of oil (in the
southern provinces) during the 1970s which (eventually) altered the
balance of power in that country and provided an additional motivation
for the conflict. In 1980 the regime in Khartoum redrew the boundaries
of the Upper Nile province to include the areas where oil had been
discovered within the north, and in 1983 it issued an order abrogating
the Addis Ababa agreement, returning powers to the central govern-
ment, eliminating the South’s autonomy and dividing it into three
administrative provinces. Shortly thereafter, Sudan was declared an
Islamic state and sharia the law throughout the country. Southerners
then mobilized around the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA),
rebelled and the second, and even more destructive, civil war began
(Harker, 2000; Gagnon and Ryle, 2001).
While there was a brief windowwhere peace appeared possible in the
late 1980s, after General Umar al-Bashir took power through a coup in
1989, the war was pursued with a vengeance with the regime in
Khartoum attempting to impose ‘‘God’s law’’ throughout the country
(Sudan Update, 1999, International Crisis Group, 2002; Martin,
2002). While there have been various attempts at settlements, and
recent (late 2003) hopes for peace, at this writing the situation in
Sudan remains unsettled and dangerous.
The Sudanese civil war is complex and can no longer be characterized
as a conflict between the Islamic north and Christian, Animist and
tribal south. While the Government’s attempt to impose Islam and
Islamic law on the entire country continues to fuel the conflict, the
longstanding marginalization of the southern provinces, an attempt
by the Government to extend its control over the disputed areas, and
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a struggle among several groups for control over Sudan’s territory and
resources are all important reasons for the continued fighting.
During the 1990s, the war evolved from its roots as a largely north–
south conflict ‘‘into a contest for power that involves groups from
across the nation.’’ In addition to the forces of the government in
Khartoum and the SPLA (now the SPLM), it involves a relatively
large number of militias and inter-tribal factions, some of whom
change sides as it is advantageous (United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Efforts, 2000, Gagnon, Macklin, and
Simons, 2003, p. 15,).
The war involves massive attacks on and displacement of civilians
and human slavery as a result of raids by Khartoum-supported mur-
ahaleen militias on southern tribes. ‘‘The vast majority of Sudan’s
casualties are not combatants killed in battle but southern civilians
who fall victim to famine and disease’’ (Martin, 2002; Gagnon,
Macklin, and Simons, 2003). While both sides are guilty of atrocities
and attacks on civilian non-combatants, there is general agreement that
the primary responsibility for the destitution, death, and destruction in
the south lies with the Government of Sudan.
Oil and Talisman’s Entry
While oil exploration and development began in Sudan in the early
1960s, serious efforts startedwith the entry of Chevronwhowas granted
a concession in 1974 (Shell later took a 25 percent interest). Although
Chevron made a number of significant discoveries and Sudanese oil
appeared to have had considerable potential, the company suspended
operations and withdrew in 1984 after a rebel group kidnapped and
killed three expatriate employees. Chevron relinquished its concessions
in 1990 after having spent $1 billion in Sudan (Sudan Update, 1999,
Harker, 2000, Energy Information Administration, 2003, Gagnon,
Macklin, and Simons, 2003).
As a result of an acquisition, Arakis Energy (a Canadian independ-
ent) gained control of a large part of Chevron’s concession in 1994; at
that point the project involved both oil exploration, development, and
production, and the construction of a pipeline to the Red Sea. Arakis,
however, could not finance the project on its own and in late 1996 it
entered into a consortium, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating
Company, in which it held a 25 percent share, the Chinese National
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Petroleum Company 40 percent, Petronas of Malaysia 30 percent, and
the Sudanese national firm 5 percent (Arakis Energy Corporation,
1998; Chase, 1998; Sudan Update, 1999).
Arakis still found itself in a very difficult situation. The US imposed
sanctions on Sudan in 1997, as a result of concerns over both that
country’s support for terrorism and human rights violations, that
prevented American participation in Sudanese oil and limited Arakis’
ability to raise funds in US markets. Furthermore, there was an eight
quarter decline in crude oil prices from$23 a barrel to a low of $13 in the
summer of 1998. In any event, when it became clear that Arakis would
not be able to raise the $200 million necessary to fund its share of the
project it encouraged offers from other companies (Cattaneo, 1998;
Jones, 1998b; Sudan Update, 1999 Gagnon, Macklin, and Simons,
2003).
On August 17, 1997 Talisman Energy acquired the outstanding
shares of Arakis, and thus acquired that company’s 25 percent share
of the Greater Nile PetroleumOperating Company (GNPOP) in Sudan.
Talisman, which originated as a spin-off of the British Petroleum’s
Canadian subsidiary, was the second largest Canadian independent
oil company by 1997 (Cattaneo, 1998; ‘‘The Human Factor,’’ 1999;
Sudan Update, 1999).4 Despite the American missile attack on the
al-Shifa plant in Khartoum a few days later, the takeover took place
as scheduled on October 8 (Jones, 1998).
A number of analysts saw the project as a high-risk–high-return
investment that made sense for the company. Despite the ongoing
civil war and the location of the concessions in themidst of the disputed
area, Talisman obtained a 25 percent share of five fields with an
estimated production of 150,000 bbls/day and a pipeline and marine
terminal expected to be completed by late 1999 (Alden, 1998;
Cattaneo, 1998; Talisman Energy, 1998).
Talisman’s short, unhappy, Sudan experience
Despite oil production and profits that far exceeded expectations,
Talisman withdrew from Sudan in March 2003, selling its 25 percent
share of GNPOP to a subsidiary of India’s national oil company
4 An independent has only ‘‘upstream’’ operations, it did not refine petro-
leum or own retail outlets.
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(‘‘TalismanCloses Sale of SudanOil Stake’’ 2003).While Talismanwas
able to handle the political situation in Sudan and produce petroleum
in spite of the civil war – production in Sudan was estimated to reach
300,000 bbls/day in 2003 and the pipeline reached capacity in 2003
(‘‘Exploration Hums as Sudan’s Output Reaches Pipeline Capacity’’
2002; ‘‘Sudan’’ 2002) – its stock price fell at the announcement of the
deal and sold at a 10 to 20 percent discount during the time Talisman
was in Sudan as compared with a 20 percent premium (to net asset
value) before the investment (Carlisle, 2000; Dabrowski, 2002; Olive,
2002).
While Talisman encountered considerable opposition from both the
United States and Canadian Governments, its difficulties were due, in
large part, to a very successful campaign waged by a coalition of
advocacy groups and NGOs who persuaded a number of institutional
investors to sell their Talisman stock and maintained a continual
barrage of pressure on Talisman’s shareholders and managers.
Sudanese production, which never amounted to more than 12 percent
of Talisman’s operations, was not worth the considerable political
costs it incurred. As CEO Jim Buckee noted after the sale,
‘‘Shareholders have told me that they were tired of continually having
to monitor and analyze events relating to Sudan’’ (‘‘Talisman to Sell
Sudan Assets for C$1.2 Billion’’ 2002).
The divestment campaign, led by the American Anti-Slavery Group,
was directed at the major institutional investors holding Talisman’s
stock. Advocacy groups linked the company directly to the brutal
violations of human rights in Sudan including forced displacement of
civilians and the slave trade. They accused the funds owning Talisman’s
stock of supporting genocide. During 1999 and 2000 at least six
American pension funds sold millions of share of the company’s stock
including TIAA-CREFF, CALPERS, The Texas Teachers’ Retirement
Fund and the New York City Pension Fund (Gillis, 1999). While it is
difficult to gauge the success of similar efforts mounted against mutual
funds such as Fidelity and Vanguard it is reasonable to assume that the
activists’ efforts had a significant effect on purchases and sales of
Talisman’s stock (Scherer, 2001).
Oil production has always been a risky business and given the very
active civil war and the location of Talisman’s operations, it is clear
that the level of political risks associated with the project were very
high. What drove Talisman from Sudan, however, was not in-country
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risk: they managed a difficult situation well and, as noted above,
production exceeded expectations. Rather, Talisman sold its
Sudanese operations because of ‘‘political risks’’ arising in North
America from activists’ successful efforts to associate it with complicity
in human rights violations in Sudan. As will be discussed below, the
Company argued that it fully complied with local law and engaged in
significant efforts to improve the lives and livelihoods of Sudanese in
the affected areas.
That raises the more general question of exactly what ‘‘complicity’’
means, what the obligations of multinational firms are with respect to
human rights violations in the countries in which they operate. I will
argue that MNCs are now regarded as international political actors
with ‘‘political’’ authority and responsibility and that directly affects
both the perception and reality of their human rights obligations. As a
first step in developing that argument, I turn to a more detailed exam-
ination of Talisman’s role, and the role of oil more generally, in Sudan.
Talisman, oil, and human rights in Sudan
While an oversimplification, it is reasonable to characterize the differ-
ences between Talisman and its critics in terms of differences in the
interpretation of events within Sudan and the extent of the company’s
responsibilities for human rights within that country. In general, the
company tended tominimize the extent of the conflict, argue that it was
overblown in the media, and see its responsibilities in terms of con-
tributing to overall economic growth and to the well-being of Sudanese
in the area through construction of schools, clinics, and the like. It is
also fair to say that the Company’s view changed somewhat over time.
There were a number of concerns expressed by a wide variety of
observers about the impact of the Company’s operations on human
rights in Sudan.
Oil production exacerbated and changed the nature of the
conflict.
Awide range of observers argue that oil production and the opening of
the pipeline by the GNPOC intensified the war and has changed its
dynamics by providing significant new resources to the government in
Khartoum. The investigation undertaken at the request of the
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Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that ‘‘oil is exacerbat-
ing the conflict in Sudan’’ (Harker, 2000, p. 14).
Oil production transformed the conflict from a fight over control of
territory to a fight over control of a valuable resource and the benefits it
produces. In 2002, a UN Special Rapporteur (Gerhart Baum) noted that
‘‘oil exploration is closely linked to the conflict . . . which is primarily a
war for the control of resources, and, thus, power’’ (cited in Human
Rights Watch, 2003, p. 58). More important, it transformed Sudan
from one of the poorest countries in Africa to an exporter of petroleum.
Oil revenues which were negligible in 1998, increased dramatically
from $61 million in 1999 – the first year of significant production –
to almost $600 million in 2001 (Energy Information Administration,
2003; Human Rights Watch, 2003); by 2001 oil revenues accounted
for around 40 percent of Sudan’s total income (Gagnon, Macklin, and
Simons, 2003). There is little question that Talisman provided the
technology and experience necessary for GNPOC to exploit Sudan’s
oil reserves; as noted above, oil production increased significantly
within a year after the company’s entry (Gagnon and Ryle, 2001).
The oil revenues were spent on arms andmilitary equipment, including
the purchase of modern weapons and helicopter gun ships. Sudan can
now manufacture its own light arms and munitions and is planning to
build tanks and artillery (International Crisis Group, 2002; Martin,
2002). The Khartoum regime’s military expenditures and military
capabilities increased dramatically as a direct result of successful oil
exploration, development, and production; by 2001 the war cost the
government over $1 million a day (International Crisis Group, 2002).
That level of expenditure would have been unthinkable before 1999.
Measures taken to provide security to oil operations have
resulted in serious human rights violations.
Talisman’s operations (as part of the GNPOC) are located in the midst
of the war zone, an area disputed by rebel forces and the government
in Khartoum. They are an obvious target and have been for some time.
As discussed above, an attack onChevron’s operations in 1984 resulted
in the deaths of three expatriate employees and led to that company’s
eventual withdrawal from Sudan. When Talisman first entered in
1998, the SPLA publically declared the company’s operations to be
a legitimate military target (Gagnon and Ryle, 2001).
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The importance of oil to the government’s war effort has led to
increased attacks on oil operations by rebel forces and increased the
intensity of the war in the area of Talisman’s operations by both sides.
The government’s response has been brutal, including attacks on civi-
lians, forced displacement of very large numbers of people, and the
burning, looting, and destruction of villages in the area (Gagnon and
Ryle, 2001).
The government is engaged in an attempt to depopulate the area
around the oil fields.
A UN Special Rapporteur (Leonardo Franco) concluded that a ‘‘swath
of scorched earth/cleared territory is being created around the oil
fields’’; the Harker investigation agreed with Franco’s findings
(Harker, 2000, p. 11). In fact, Human Rights Watch concludes that
‘‘forced displacement of the civilian population, and the death and
destruction that have accompanied it, are the central human rights
issues relating to oil development in Sudan’’ (2003, p. 36).
Similarly, an article in The Economist (2001, p. 41) notes that the
government of Sudan has ‘‘adopted a brutal new policy of clearing
the oil areas.’’ Before the marked increase in oil production in 1999,
the government armed Arab militia groups and encouraged them to
raid southern villages for cattle and to take slaves. While this certainly
resulted inwidespread suffering, it did not entail themassive displacement
of the civilian population seen since oil production became an issue.
As noted above, oil operations are in disputed border areas and the
government wants ‘‘the southeners out’’ Economist, (2001). The
Human Rights Watch (2003) report on oil and human rights in
Sudan contains an extensive discussion of the displacement of civilians
from the oil producing areas both before and after Talisman’s entry.
Talisman’s facilities were used to stage military action against
both rebel and civilian targets.
Talisman itself agreed that there were at least four instances of the use
of its airstrip at the Heglig field for ‘‘non-defensive’’ military purposes
(Talisman Energy, 2000; Gagnon, Macklin, and Simons, 2003). The
Harker Report (Harker, 2000, p 15) noted that ‘‘ . . . flights clearly
linked to the oil war have been a regular feature of life at the Heglig
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airstrip . . . It is operated by the consortium, and Canadian chartered
helicopters and fixed wing aircraft which use the strip have shared the
facilities with helicopter gunships and Antonov bombers of the GOS
[Government of Sudan]. These have armed and re-fuelled at Heglig and
from there attacked civilians.’’ Furthermore, a number of observers
have concluded that the government used the infrastructure built by the
oil companies – the roads and bridges – to launch attacks on civilians in
the area (Human Rights Watch, 2003).
Complicity
I suspect that most observers, including Talisman Energy, would agree
that the military use of corporate facilities – especially for non-defensive
operations – is inappropriate and renders the company complicit in the
ensuing human rights violations. Once one moves beyond this sort of
direct involvement in the violations of human rights, however, the
situation gets much more ambiguous. Talisman is a private company
whose obligation to its shareholders to generate revenue and profits
requires it to explore, develop, and produce petroleum. It is certainly
not unusual for oil reserves to be found in difficult environments, both
physically and politically. Does Talisman, or any other company in a
similar situation, have obligations which go beyond avoiding direct
complicity in human rights violations and obeying the law of both host
and home countries? The regime in Khartoum is recognized as sovereign
internationally and one could argue it was appropriate for Talisman to
rely on the Government of Sudan to defend its operations against rebel
attacks.
I will argue that as multinationals emerge as significant actors in
international politics, their new-found ‘‘private’’ political authority will
bring with it ‘‘public’’ political responsibilities. The line between public
authorities and private economic actors has blurred to the point where
MNCs may begin to be held liable for a much broader definition of
complicity in human rights violations, which may even include a positive
responsibility to effect a change in the host country’s human rights
policies. There have been a number of recent attempts to define ‘‘compli-
city’’ or to suggest the extent of MNCs’ responsibilities for human rights.
Gagnon, Macklin and Simons (2003, p 8) use Canadian and inter-
national law to define complicity in the commission of acts of a
perpetrator [of human rights violations] as:
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* Acts or omissions that provide material assistance in circumstances where
the TNC [Transnational Corporation] knew or should have known that its
acts or omissions would provide such assistance.
* Acts or omissions that abet the perpetrator in circumstances where the
TNC knew or ought to have known that its acts or omissions would
encourage the perpetrator.
* Where a TNC enters into a commercial relationship with one or more
parties in a conflict zone, and any of those parties commits acts in violation
of the Code in furtherance of that commercial undertaking, the TNC is
complicit if it knew or ought to have known that the commission of the
acts would be a probable consequence of carrying out the commercial
relationship with that party.
In their extensive review of oil and human rights in Sudan, Human
Rights Watch (2003, p. 61) puts it more directly: ‘‘ . . . [Talisman] had a
responsibility to ensure that its business operations did not depend upon,
or benefit from, gross human rights abuses such as those that have been
committed by the government and its proxy forces in Sudan.’’
The UN Global Compact, which is a voluntary initiative to promote
‘‘responsible corporate citizenship,’’ devotes two of its nine principles
to human rights (Global Compact, 2003b). Principle One states that
businesses should ‘‘support and respect the protection of internation-
ally proclaimed human rights within their sphere of influence.’’ In its
elaboration of Principle One, the compact argues that, at a minimum,
business should ‘‘ensure its operations are consistentwith legal principles
in the country of operation.’’ It also notes that businesses may have an
opportunity to promote human rights and raise standards in host coun-
tries. Businesses can prevent the ‘‘forcible displacement of individuals,
groups and communities’’ and have a right and responsibility to express
their view on human rights to governments (Global Compact, 2003b).
Principle Two states that businesses should make sure that they are
not complicit in human rights abuses. Complicity is defined in the
following terms (Global Compact, 2003b):
* Direct Complicity occurs when a company knowingly assists a state in
violating human rights. Assisting in forced location is given as an example.
* Beneficial Complicity suggests that a company benefits from the abuse of
human rights. Violations by security forces guarding installations are given
as an example.
* Silent Complicity involves the failure by a company to raise the question of
systematic violations of human rights with authorities.
194 Stephen J. Kobrin
E:/3-PAGINATION/IBG/2-FIRST_PROOF/3B2/0521850029C08.3D – 177 – [177–201/25] 6.4.2005 2:16PM
Last, the ‘‘UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations . . . ’’ is, perhaps, most explicit about the extended
human rights responsibilities of MNCs. While noting that states have
the primary responsibility for human rights protection, including
ensuring the compliance ofMNCs, it goes on to state that transnational
corporations have ‘‘ . . . the obligation to promote, secure the fulfill-
ment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized
in international as well as national law . . . ’’ (United Nations Social
and Economic Council, 2003, p. 3. emphasis added). Furthermore,
transnational corporations are held to recognize applicable norms of
international law, national law and regulation, the rule of law, the
public interest, development objectives, etc. (UnitedNations Social and
Economic Council, 2003, p. 4).
Two points are obvious from this brief summary. First, most if not all
go well beyond the traditional view of the MNC as a private actor, an
object rather than a subject of international law and politics.MNCs are
held to a positive duty to promote and secure human rights that
transcends obeying national law and regulation. Furthermore, these
statements – especially the UN ‘‘Norms’’ – appear to point toward
liability for MNCs for human rights violations under international
law. Second, it is far from clear what any of these strictures mean in
practice. Do any operations in a conflict ridden country ‘‘benefit’’ from
human rights violations as a matter of course?
Complicity or constructive engagement?
As the criticism of its operations in Sudan mounted, Talisman Energy
established a dedicated Corporate Social Responsibility Group in
March 2000; as a result two Corporate Social Responsibility Reports
were published in 2000 and 2001. In the second, CEO Jim Buckee
notes, ‘‘Some express the opinion that we should leave Sudan, however,
many people we speak to believe that the appropriate moral response is
to stay and use our corporate resources in a broad and responsible
manner to encourage peace, provide economic opportunities and sup-
port the communities in the areas in which we operate’’ (Talisman
Energy, 2001, p. 5). The Company consistently took the position that
its presence in Sudanwas beneficial, even as it sold its operations in 2003.
It should be noted that one of themajor points of contention between
Talisman and its critics is the extent of forced dislocations of the
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civilian population in the area of the oil concessions. As noted above,
the human rights organizations active in Sudan, the UN Special
Rapporteurs, and the Canadian Government’s Harker Report all
found that there were massive forced displacement of civilians in the
UpperWest Nile Region. The Company tended to dismiss local conflict
as tribal in origin and after commissioning a satellite photo study con-
cluded that ‘‘there was no evidence of appreciable human migration –
in other words displacement – within the concession areas studied’’
(Talisman Energy, 2001, p. 16). They did go on to note that ‘‘many
people hold a differing opinion on this issue.’’
It does appear clear that the Company either knew or should have
known the full extent of the situation it was getting into. The ‘‘second civil
war’’ in Sudan had been raging for fifteen years when it entered in 1998;
most of the rural areas in the oil concessions had been outside of govern-
ment control since that time (Gagnon andRyle, 2001). The government’s
strategy of ‘‘division and displacement’’ of the southern population had
been in place since the 1980s (Human Rights Watch, 2003).
Furthermore, Chevron had been forced out by rebel activity and the
SPLA had made it clear that they considered the oil concessions a target.
Canadian NGOs approached Talisman immediately upon its
announcement of its takeover of Arakis to protest their involvement in
Sudan, citing the considerable human rights abuses in that country. By
late 1999, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Lloyd Axworthy)
had expressed strong reservations about Talisman’s involvement in
Sudan (Bowley, 1999; Foster, 1999). Talisman’s response, at least
at first, was to deny the mass displacement of civilians; there is no
evidence that they made an effort to mount an investigation of the
allegations of human rights abuses before entering the country
(Human Rights Watch, 2003).
There is no doubt that Sudan during the time of Talisman’s invest-
ment represents an unusually stark and difficult environment in which
to operate responsibly with regards to human rights. I suspect that
there would be general agreement about what constitutes direct com-
plicity in human rights violations: consenting to the government’s use
of the airstrip to mount ‘‘non-defensive’’ operations, for example, or
assisting in the forced dislocation of civilians to clear a concession area.
At the other extreme, Gagnon and Ryle (2001, p. 39) argue that ‘‘a
company operating in the war zone of Sudan cannot be neutral. Every
aspect of its operation benefits one side – the government side – in a
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conflict where human rights violations are the norm. In these conditions,
all aspects of oil development contribute to the worsening situation for
the inhabitants of the Upper Nile.’’ It is not unreasonable to ask
whether the act of entering the country, in this case producing and
transporting oil in Sudan, renders the company ‘‘complicit’’ in human
rights violations. Given the need to secure facilities and the very high
probability of a rebel attack on oil operations and some knowledge of
the government’s strategy and tactics to date, should it have been clear
that the company would be dependent on the government to protect its
concessions and that human rights violations would be probable in the
course of government operations? Could any oil company enter Sudan
in 1998 without becoming ‘‘beneficially complicent?’’
While Talisman has tended tominimize the forced dislocations taking
place as a result of oil exploration (as noted above), one of the UN
Special Rapporteurs has been quoted as saying that ‘‘if the oil companies
don’t knowwhat’s going on, they’re not looking over the fences of their
compounds’’ (Harker, 2000, p. 14). Assuming that the Harker Report
and other human rights monitoring in Sudan are correct, it is reason-
able to argue that any oil firm entering Sudan should have known that
the concessions were in the midst of a war zone, that the government
had engaged in human rights abuses in attempting to clear that area
previously, and that the company would be dependent on government
forces accused of human rights abuses to defend their concessions from
attack. It is hard to avoid a conclusion that any oil firm entering Sudan
had to accept that it was likely to both benefit from human rights
abuses on the part of the government and depend on them for survival.
Direct complicity and determining that merely entering the country
constitutes as complicity are two ends of a continuum, there is a great
deal of ground in between. One possibility is certainly constructive
engagement, where a company undertakes a positive obligation to
influence the policy of the regime and mitigate human rights abuses.
As the Harker Report concluded (Harker, 2000, p. 17), ‘‘ . . . if the com-
pany is either unwilling or unable to constructively influence the GOS
[Government of Sudan], perhaps it should not be in Sudan at this time.’’
My point here is that defining ‘‘complicity’’ specifically or the obliga-
tions ofMNCswith regards to human rights more generally is complex
and may well be beyond the capabilities of a given firm at any point in
time. As multinational firms take on ‘‘public’’ authority and ‘‘public’’
responsibilities, including potential liability for human rights
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violations, determining the extent of those responsibilities and liabil-
ities becomes critically important. I will return to this topic below.
Talisman’s response
As discussed above, Talisman Energy responded to the mounting wave
of criticism of its operations in Sudan by establishing a Corporate
SocialResponsibilityGroup in early 2000.One resultwas the publication
of twoCorporate Social Responsibility Reports (2000 and 2001) which
focused on the Company’s operations in Sudan. In his introduction to
the first, CEO Buckee noted that ‘‘as a business we should focus on
delivering shareholder value and to do this effectively, we must achieve
high standards of social and environmental performance. In all countries
where we operate, we believe that we have a duty to advocate respect
for human rights where there are abuses’’ (Talisman Energy, 2000,
p. 7). While the reports are controversial and the Company’s response
has been disputed by advocacy organizations, what is of interest here is
that they indicate an acceptance of responsibilities that go far beyond
focusing ‘‘on delivering shareholder value’’ and obeying the law.
By the time of publication of the 2000 Report, Talisman had
‘‘accepted’’ the need to comply with the International Code of Ethics
for Canadian Business and to support the principle of the UN
Declaration for Human Rights. It also accepted as ‘‘objectives’’ the
need to use their corporate influence to ensure that GNPOC infrastruc-
ture was not used for offensive military operations, to promote ‘‘to the
Government of Sudan the formalization of the provision of security that
complies with the pertinent UN Codes of Conduct’’ and to advocate
support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with the
Government. It did note that security of its operations and personnel
was a primary concern and that the Government of Sudan had ‘‘primary
protection for the protection of oilfield staff and property’’ (Talisman
Energy, 2000, pp. 9 and 14). The report also describes the more tradi-
tional community development efforts such as funding for schools,
water development, and clinics as well as human rights monitoring
efforts.
During 2001 Talisman reported an attempt to develop an agreement
between GNPOC and the Government of Sudan that contained provi-
sions dealing with respect for human rights, the appropriate use of
oilfield infrastructure, and the prohibition of the use of irregular
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Sudanese military forces for oilfield protection. It also asked that the
Government ensure that all security forces comply with appropriate
United Nations codes. The Government of Sudan ‘‘ultimately rejected
the draft security agreement . . . on the basis that the provision of
security is the prime responsibility and prerogative of governments and
that these issues were not appropriate to be addressed by a company
residing in and operating under the laws of Sudan’’ (Talisman Energy,
2001, p. 17).
The Canadian government backs off
In late 1999Madeline Albright, the US Secretary of State sent a strongly
worded letter to Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian Foreign Affairs
Minister, urging him to ask Talisman to withdraw from Sudan (Frank,
1999). While Axworthy was initially somewhat miffed over US involve-
ment in Canadian affairs, he quickly called CEO Jim Buckee in for
consultations and launched a high-profile investigation of Talisman’s
involvement in Sudan culminating in the Harker mission and report.
He threatened sanctions if the investigation found that oil money was
either perpetuating the conflict or contributing to human rights abuses
(Bowley, 1999; Drohan, 1999; Foster, 1999; Nikifouruk, 1999).
While the Harker Report stopped short of explicitly recommending
sanctions, it found that oil had become a key factor in the war, that oil
exacerbated the conflict, and that ‘‘it is difficult to imagine a cease-fire
while oil extraction continues, and almost impossible to do so if rev-
enues keep flowing to GNOPC parents and the GOS . . . ’’ (Harker,
2000, p 16). The Canadian government, however, did not impose any
sanctions or restrictions on Talisman.
Mr. Axworthy had discussed the possibilities of sanctions a number
of times. In March 1999 he told a conference on religious prosecution
he had met with oil executives about the situation in Sudan, noting
‘‘We’ve been engaged recently in the role we play in Sudan, partly
because I think that there is a responsibility of Canada because of the
activities of some of our private-sector companies’’ (Human Rights
Watch, 2003, p. 393). Somewhat later he warned that ‘‘if it becomes
evident that oil extraction is exacerbating the conflict in Sudan, or
resulting in violations of human rights or humanitarian law, the
government of Canada may consider, if required, economic and trade
restrictions . . . ’’ (cited in Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 401). On
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February 14, 2000 Mr. Axworthy announced that Canada would not
impose sanctions on Talisman.
The turn-about resulted from a massive public relations campaign
mounted by Talisman, including at least implicit suggestions that it was
important to keep the head office of a major Canadian firm in Canada,
and pressure from the Canadian oil industry in general. Axworthy later
noted that he had gotten ahead of himself ‘‘when I set up the Harker
Commission I said, ‘look, we’ll do something about it.’ And then I got
the rug pulled out from under me because I didn’t have the legislative
authority I thought I did . . . And I’m not sure I could have done it
politically, because I got a lot of pressure around town’’ (Drohan, 2003,
p. 271).
A governance gap
There are a number of critical points to be drawn from the case of
Talisman Energy in Sudan. First, in a very real sense, the company
activities in that country were beyond the reach of any ‘‘public’’ political
authority. The government of Sudan had no interest whatsoever in
restraining human rights abuses in that country and rebuffed even
Talisman’s rather tepid effort at an agreement in that area. The
Canadian government was either unable or unwilling to extend its
reach to the extraterritorial activities of one of its companies to protect
non-Canadian citizens outside of its territory. Last, the firm as a private
actor was beyond the reach of existing international organizations or
international law. As Gagnon, Macklin, and Simons conclude, ‘‘At
present, corporations are not directly accountable at international
law for their activities and operations that violate human rights stan-
dards. While an increasingly sophisticated regime of corporate rights is
developing under various free trade agreements . . . none of these
agreements link corporate rights or the rights of the states parties to
obligations to ensure respect for human rights in the conduct of busi-
ness’’ (2003, p. 51).
Second, defining the human rights obligations of multinational firms
in situations such as that in Sudan is complex and extremely difficult.
Once one accepts that the obligation of the firm goes beyond obeying
local law, such as it is, it is not easy to draw boundaries around the
firm’s responsibility or set standards for behavior. In this case one
could argue that simply entering into oil production in Sudan entailed
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some degree of complicity in human rights violations. The point is that
once one moves beyond a narrow definition of responsibility to the
shareholders, defining that responsibility cannot be left to the individual
firm. It becomes a task of society at large.
Third, the mechanisms used in the case to attempt to force Talisman
to accept responsibility for its actions in Sudan, and eventually to
withdraw from that country, were less than satisfactory from a govern-
ance perspective. The Alien Tort Claims Act Cases in United States
Courts are an ad hoc and cobbled-together attempt at global govern-
ance by extending the jurisdictional reach of a single country.While the
NGOs’ advocacy efforts with institutional investors eventually drove
Talisman to sell its operations in Sudan, that surely is not the best way
to establish the rule of law internationally. At a minimum, it relies on
primarily Northern NGOs and multinational firms to make policy in
third world countries.
As noted above, Kofi Anan argues that definitions of sovereignty
have changed and that human rights violations within countries are
now the responsibility of the international community. Furthermore,
as should be clear from the arguments and case detailed in this paper,
the rights and responsibilities of multinational firms can no longer be
considered purely derivative: as they gain political authority in the
international arena, MNCs will increasingly be held to responsibilities,
and potential liabilities, beyond that of the traditional private
economic actor.
The problem at this point is that systems of global governance are ill-
formed and incomplete. Attempting to hold multinational firms
accountable through campaigns by advocacy groups or action in US
courts is not fair, democratic, or effective. There is every indication that
multinational firms are increasingly being held to broader, public
standards in the area of human rights and other issue areas. If that is
the case, then coordinated international action is needed to establish
standards, monitor compliance, and enforce sanctions. Given the
evolution of the political system that will require cooperation between
a number of actors including the firms themselves, states, civil society
groups, and international organizations. Holding firms accountable
under some agreed upon form of international law or regulation will
be bothmore effective in dealingwith human rights abuses and fairer to
the firms involved.
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